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STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the trial court's dismissal with prejudice 
instead of dismissing Plaintiff Layne Hess's ("Mr. Hess" or "Plaintiff) Complaint 
without prejudice when the Court of Appeals (despite reversing the trial court's legal 
conclusion) ruled on the merits of the claims and allegations, without allowing Plaintiff 
an opportunity to amend his Complaint. [June 21, 2007 Opinion ("Opinion") at ffif 13, 
26]. 
The district court's dismissal of Plaintiff s Complaint is reviewed by this Court for 
correctness and in reaching its decision this Court must accept the Complaint's factual 
allegations as true and draw all inference's in Plaintiffs favor. See Stokes v. Wagoner, 
1999 UT 94, f6, 987 P.2d 602. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This petition for rehearing arises from this Court's affirming of the trial court's 
dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiff s Complaint despite making its determination on 
grounds other than those relied upon by the trial court. [Opinion at f 13]. 
On January 9, 2006, Defendant filed her Motion for Sanctions and Motion for 
Dismissal with Prejudice along with supporting memoranda. [R. at 15-32]. Defendant's 
motions essentially asserted that Mr. Hess' claims were barred by the Utah Supreme 
Court's decision in Jackson v. Brown. 904 P.2d 685 (Utah 1995), which held that Utah's 
cause of action for breach of an agreement to marry was abolished. [R. at 15-32]. 
1 
Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to Plaintiffs motions on January 27, 2006, 
and Defendant filed a reply memorandum on February 9, 2006. [R. at 34-54], Following 
briefing, a hearing was held before the Honorable Dennis J. Frederick on April 10, 2006. 
[R. at 58, 88]. By its April 11, 2006 Minute Entry, the trial court issued its decision 
granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, but denying Defendant's Motion for Sanctions. 
[R. at 61-63]. The trial court signed a Final Order Dismissing Action with Prejudice on 
April 25, 2006. [R. at 64-65]. 
Plaintiff filed his Notice of Appeal of the Final Order Dismissing Action with 
Prejudice on May 25, 2006. [R. at 70-71]. Defendant filed her Notice of Cross-Appeal 
on May 31,2006, by which Defendant seeks a reversal of the trial court's denial of 
Defendant's Motion for Sanctions. [R. at 72]. 
Oral argument on the parties' cross-appeals was held on May 31, 2007. On June 
21, 2007, this Court issued its Opinion, which reversed the trial court's detennination that 
Jackson v. Brown abolished all causes of action arising from a termination of an 
agreement to marry, but affirmed the trial court's dismissal with prejudice after 
considering the sufficiency of the facts alleged by Plaintiff to support Plaintiffs claims. 
[Opinion at ffi[ 13-26]. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts are relevant to Mr. Hess' Petition for Rehearing: 
1. On January 9, 2006, Defendant filed her Motion for Sanctions and Motion 
for Dismissal with Prejudice along with supporting memoranda. [R. at 15-32]. 
2 
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prejudice after considering the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the Complaint by 
Plaintiff to support Plaintiffs claims. [Opinion at ff 13-26]. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court erred in affirming the trial court's dismissal with prejudice even though 
this Court specifically reversed the trial court's determination that Mr. Hess' claims were 
barred by the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Jackson v. Brown. This Court affirmed 
the trial court's dismissal with prejudice on the alternative grounds that Hess failed to 
allege fact sufficient to support its claims. However, as a general rule, a Rule 12(b)(6) 
dismissal should be without prejudice because it only addresses the formal sufficiency of 
the Complaint and not the factual merit of the claims. Accordingly, this Court should 
revise its opinion to clarify that the dismissal of Plaintiff s claims is without prejudice, so 
that Plaintiff has the opportunity to file an amended complaint. 
ARGUMENT 
L THIS COURT SHOULD CLARIFY THAT THE DISMISSAL OF 
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT IS WITHOUT PREJUDICE, THUS 
ALLOWING PLAINTIFF AN OPPORTUNITY TO AMEND HIS 
COMPLAINT. 
This Court should clarify that the dismissal of Plaintiff s Complaint is without 
prejudice, as is appropriate for a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal based on the sufficiency (or lack 
thereof) of the allegations of the Complaint.1 Rule 8(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure requires that a Complaint contain a "short and plain statement... showing that 
1
 Although this Court did not directly state that its dismissal on alternative grounds was with or without prejudice, 
by simply affirming the trial court's dismissal, which was with prejudice, it must be assumed that Plaintiffs' 
Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. 
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unable to cure the defects in the pleading and properly plead facts supporting alter ego 
liability). 
In this case, the trial court held that the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Jackson 
v. Brown, 904 P.2d 685 (Utah 1995), which abolished the Utah cause of action for breach 
of a contract to marry, wholly barred Plaintiffs claims and, therefore, dismissed 
Plaintiffs Complaint with prejudice. Plaintiff appealed that decision, which this Court 
reversed. However, this Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal on the alternative 
grounds that the allegations of Plaintiff s Complaint failed to support the asserted causes 
of action. In reaching its decision, this Court reviewed Plaintiffs factual allegations as 
they related to the elements of each cause of action and determined that Plaintiff had 
failed to state claims upon which relief could be granted. Notably, this Court did not 
determine that Plaintiff could not allege any facts that would support the asserted causes 
of action. Accordingly, regardless of whether this Court correctly ruled or not, Plaintiffs 
Complaint should have been dismissed without prejudice, and Plaintiff should be allowed 
an opportunity to correct any perceived deficiencies in the factual allegations of his 
Complaint. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff requests that this Court modify its Opinion by 
stating that Plaintiffs Complaint is dismissed without prejudice, remand this case to the 
trial court, and allow Hess reasonable time to amend his Complaint. 
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ADDENDUM 
Attached hereto as an addendum is this Court's June 21, 2007 Opinion. 
DATED this 5th day of July, 2007. 
MILLER GUYMON, P.C. 
'axtbnR. 
Joel T. Zenger, Esq. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM NO. 1 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Layne D. Hess, an individual, 
Plaintiff, Appellant, and 
Cross-appellee, 
v. 
Jody Johnston, an individual, 
Defendant, Appellee, and 
Cross-appellant. 
OPINION 
(For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20060497-CA 
F I L E D 
( J u n e 2 1 , 2 0 0 7 ) 
2 0 0 7 UT A p p 2 1 3 
Third District, Salt Lake Department, 050919801 
The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
Attorneys: Paxton R. Guymon and Joel T. Zenger, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellant and Cross-appellee 
David W. Scofield, Salt Lake City, for Appellee and 
Cross-appellant 
Before Judges Davis, McHugh, and Orme. 
McHUGH, Judge: 
fl Plaintiff Layne D. Hess appeals the trial court's order 
dismissing his complaint, with prejudice, for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted, see Utah R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6). Defendant Jody Johnston cross-appeals, arguing that 
the trial court committed error when it denied her motion for 
sanctions under rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, see 
Utah R. Civ. P. 11. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND1 
xIn considering the correctness of an order dismissing a 
complaint, we assume the truthfulness of each of the facts 
alleged by plaintiff. See Oakwood Vill. L.L.C. v. 
Inc., 2004 UT 101,^9, 104 P.3d 1226. 
Albertsons, 
f2 Hess and Johnston started dating in mid-April 2 004 and 
within three months, they decided to marry. Johnston found an 
engagement ring she liked, and Hess commissioned a jeweler to 
craft one like it. The couple planned to marry sometime in 
November 2004, but mutually decided that they would take their 
time in planning the wedding to ensure their finances were in 
order. 
%3 About this time, Johnston told Hess that, during their 
engagement, she wanted to go on some trips and wanted Hess to 
have a vasectomy. Hess complied with these requests. Hess began 
by paying for the couple to take a seven-day cruise to Alaska at 
the end of July. In August, Hess underwent the vasectomy 
procedure requested by Johnston. And in September, after 
Johnston expressed an interest in traveling to France to 
introduce Hess to friends she had met while living there years 
earlier, Hess paid for the couple to travel to France for three 
weeks. Before leaving on the trip, Hess paid the balance on the 
custom engagement ring so that he could present Johnston with it 
while in France. After returning from France, Hess and Johnston 
twice rescheduled the wedding, first, from November 2 0 04 to May 
5, 2005, and then to July 9, 2005. In October 2004, Johnston 
also asked Hess to help purchase a vehicle for her son. Hess 
contributed $24 0 0 toward the automobile. 
1J4 In late April 2 005, without any forewarning or explanation, 
Johnston returned the engagement ring to Hess and informed him 
that she would not be his wife. Hess attempted, numerous times, 
to obtain an explanation from Johnston, but she refused to offer 
any excuse for breaking off the engagement. 
%5 In November 2005, Hess brought suit against Johnston seeking 
restitution under four different legal theories: (1) conditional 
gift, (2) unjust enrichment, (3) promissory estoppel or 
reasonable reliance, and (4) breach of contract. Central to all 
the claims is the argument that but for Johnston's promise to 
marry him, Hess would not have paid for the engagement ring, the 
Alaskan cruise, the trip to France, or the vehicle for Johnston's 
son. Hess sought restitution in the form of reimbursement for 
Johnston's portion of the travel expenses, the medical costs of 
the vasectomy and a reversal procedure, the money given toward 
the vehicle, and the difference between the purchase price of the 
engagement ring and its eventual sale price. In response, 
Johnston sought sanctions under rule 11 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure and moved to dismiss the complaint, with 
prejudice, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted. The trial court denied the motion for sanctions but 
dismissed the complaint on the ground that Utah has abolished the 
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common law cause of action for breach of a promise to marry. 
Both parties appeal. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1|6 Johnston contends that it was error for the trial court to 
deny her motion for sanctions under rule 11 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, see Utah R. Civ. P. 11. 
[T]he standard of review for evaluating the 
denial or imposition of rule 11 sanctions 
involves a three-tiered approach: "(1) 
findings of fact are reviewed under the 
clearly erroneous standard; (2) legal 
conclusions are reviewed under the correction 
of error standard; and (3) the type and 
amount of sanctions to be imposed [are] 
reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard." 
Morse v. Packer, 2000 UT 86,1|l6, 15 P.3d 1021 (quoting Morse v. 
Packer, 1999 UT 5,1110, 973 P.2d 422). 
1|7 Hess argues that the trial court erred when it granted 
Johnston's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted under rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, see Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). "A [r]ule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss admits the facts alleged in the 
complaint but challenges the plaintiff's right to relief based on 
those facts." Oakwood Vill. L.L.C. v. Albertsons, Inc. , 2004 UT 
101,1(8, 104 P.3d 1226 (quotations omitted). Therefore, when 
reviewing a trial court's grant of a 12(b) (6) motion, "we accept 
the factual allegations in the complaint as true and interpret 
those facts and all inferences drawn from them in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff as the non-moving party." Id. at %9. 
After viewing the facts in this light, the question of whether a 
complaint "was properly dismissed for failure to state a claim is 
a question of law, which we review for correctness." Davis v. 
Central Utah Counseling Ctr. , 2006 UT 52,1(16, 147 P.3d 390. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Rule 11 Sanctions 
1)8 Johnston contends that because the Utah Supreme Court has 
abolished the cause of action for breach of a promise to marry, 
Hess's claims were frivolous and merited sanctions under rule 11. 
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Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in relevant 
part: 
(b) . . . By presenting a pleading, written 
motion, or other paper to the court . . . an 
attorney or unrepresented party is certifying 
that to the best of the person's knowledge, 
information, and belief, formed after an 
inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, 
(b)(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal 
contentions therein are warranted by existing 
law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the 
extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law or the establishment of new 
law [.] 
Utah R. Civ. P. 11(b). However, n[r]ule 11 does not impose a 
duty to do perfect or exhaustive research. The appropriate 
standard is whether the research was objectively reasonable under 
all the circumstances." Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229, 1236 
(Utah 1992). 
%9 Johnston argues that Jackson v. Brown, 904 P.2d 685 (Utah 
1995) , clearly abolished the cause of action for breach of a 
promise to marry, including claims of the type asserted by Hess. 
Therefore, she reasons that sanctions were proper because, given 
the settled state of the law, Hess would not have brought his 
claims had he first made the reasonable inquiry required by rule 
ll.2 We disagree. First, we begin by noting that "the 
reasonable inquiry analysis does not hinge solely on whether the 
law is clear. [Instead, t]he focus should be on what the 
attorney actually did in researching the law." Barnard, 846 P.2d 
at 1236-37. Second, and perhaps more importantly, we disagree 
with Johnston1s contention that Jackson clearly bars Hessfs 
claims. Instead, we read Jackson as expressly acknowledging the 
possibility that some economic claims arising out of a failed 
engagement may still be viable. 
2Because Johnston's argument raises a question of law, we 
review it for correctness under the second tier of the rule 11 
standard of review. See Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229, 1236 
(Utah 1992) (reviewing, for correctness, whether existing law was 
clear such that attorney's decision to proceed with claims 
demonstrated a failure to make a reasonable inquiry under rule 
11) . 
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[^10 In Jackson, the Utah Supreme Court examined the common law 
cause of action for breach of a promise to marry. See 904 P. 2d 
at 686-87. In abolishing that claim from Utah's common law, the 
court first examined the history of the cause of action, noting 
that it "arose over four hundred years ago," when marriage was 
viewed primarily as an economic transaction. Id. at 686. 
Because of the economic nature of matrimony, the cause of action 
for breach of promise provided an economic remedy to persons who 
had relied to their detriment on a recanted promise of marriage. 
See id. The court noted, however, that over time "American 
marriage customs ha[ve] so changed as to be totally unlike those 
prevailing when breach of promise first became actionable." Id. 
The court reasoned that because modern concepts of marriage focus 
primarily on emotion--not economics--the breach of promise cause 
of action had lost its historical moorings such that "an action 
developed to remedy the economic losses resulting from the 
withdrawal of a marriage promise . . . [was being] used in this 
day and age to redress the emotional losses that follow [ed] ." 
Id. at 687 (emphasis added). The supreme court found this use of 
a breach of promise claim antithetical to modern policy 
considerations and held that the cause of action was no longer 
"the proper vehicle" to recover for emotional damages where the 
"losses complained of are pride, love, and esteem." Id. Rather, 
the court held that recovery for emotional damages was properly 
pursued only through a claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress and only if the strict elements of such a 
claim could be established. See id. at 687-88. 
i[ll Despite abolishing the cause of action for breach of a 
promise to marry, the Jackson court specifically left open the 
question of whether economic damages arising from a broken 
engagement could ever be recovered under alternate legal 
theories. All the justices agreed that, despite abolishing the 
cause of action for breach of a promise to marry, "no injury to a 
plaintiff, upon proper showing, goes unremedied." Id. at 687. A 
majority of the court, however, postponed deciding which legal 
theories would support recovery of economic damages stemming from 
a broken engagement. See id. at 688 (Stewart, J., concurring, 
joined by Zimmerman, C.J. & Russon, J.) (stating that the issue 
of what theories would support a recovery of economic damages 
"should be addressed . . . only when it is properly presented to 
[the c]ourt and properly argued by the parties"). Alternatively, 
Justice Durham, joined by Justice Howe, anticipated the question 
and suggested that "any economic losses suffered because of 
[plaintiff's] reasonable reliance upon [defendant's] promise to 
marry . . . may be recoverable under a theory of reasonable 
reliance or breach of contract." Id. at 687 (Durham, J., 
concurrinq, joined by Howe, J.). 
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i]l2 Because Jackson did not clearly foreclose claims for purely 
economic damages, we cannot say that Hess's reading of the law, 
alone, supports the conclusion that he did not make a reasonable 
inquiry into the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions 
contained in the complaint. Rule 11 does not "require the 
attorney to reach the correct legal position from the research. 
It is enough that the attorney's reading of the law is a 
reasonable one." Barnard, 846 P.2d at 1236. Therefore, we 
affirm the trial court's denial of Johnston's motion for rule 11 
sanctions. 
II. Failure to State a Claim 
i)l3 Despite finding that Jackson does not clearly bar his 
claims, we nonetheless affirm the trial court's dismissal of 
Hess's complaint because the facts as alleged cannot support 
recovery under any of the theories pleaded. Cf. Griffith v. 
Griffith, 1999 UT 78,18, 985 P.2d 258 (affirming on alternative 
grounds). 
A. Conditional Gift 
f14 Assuming, without deciding, that Utah would allow recovery 
of engagement gifts under a theory of conditional gift, Hess's 
claims fail as a matter of law because he has not alleged facts 
that could establish that the travel, vasectomy,3 or money for 
the vehicle were conditioned on the marriage taking place.4 
Instead, Hess urges this court to adopt the position that any 
gift given during the engagement period carries an implied 
condition of marriage. We decline to do so. If we were to imply 
3Under the facts of this case, it is not necessary to 
address whether a vasectomy, undertaken by one person in a 
relationship, can ever be a "gift" to the other person in the 
relationship. 
4We note the possible exception of the engagement ring. 
See, e.g., Fierro v. Hoel, 465 N.W.2d 669, 671 (Iowa Ct. App. 
1990) ("An engagement ring given in contemplation of marriage is 
an impliedly conditional gift."); Heiman v. Parrish, 942 P.2d 
631, 634 (Kan. 1997) ("Once it is established the ring is an 
engagement ring, it is a conditional gift."). However, because 
Johnston returned the ring, Hess received back exactly that which 
he gave. Consequently, he has already received restitution, and 
this court need not address whether the gift of an engagement 
ring carries with it an implied condition of marriage requiring 
its return when the wedding does not ensue. 
20060497-CA 6 
a condition on all gifts given during the engagement period, 
every gift would be recoverable regardless of the size, cost, 
significance, or nature of the gift, and without regard to the 
surrounding circumstances under which the gift was given. 
Surely, the donor will give some gifts during 
the engagement period that are intended as 
absolute gifts. However, with an implied 
condition, the donor would have to expressly 
indicate that he does not expect the gift 
back in order to make an absolute gift. . . . 
turn[ing] traditional gift law on its head. 
Cooper v. Smith, 155 Ohio App. 3d 218, 2003-Ohio-6083, 800 N.E.2d 
372, at |26. 
1)15 Because we do not accept Hess's contention that all gifts 
given during the engagement period carry an implied condition of 
marriage, and because "one asserting the delivery [of a gift] was 
made on some condition . . . has the burden of establishing such 
condition" as an element of recovery under a conditional gift 
theory, Fierro v. Hoel, 465 N.W.2d 669, 671 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990), 
we examine Hess's complaint for allegations that could support 
his contention that the gifts were conditional. 
|^l6 Hess's complaint states that, in retrospect, Hess would not 
have made the expenditures but for Johnston1s promise to marry 
him. But this assertion, relying on hindsight, even if true, is 
not sufficient to establish that the gifts were conditioned on 
the marriage taking place. "Whether a gift is conditional or 
absolute is a question of the donor's intent, to be determined 
from any express declaration by the donor at the time of the 
making of the gift or from the circumstances." 38 Am. Jur. 2d 
Gifts § 72 (1999) (emphasis added). 
]^l7 Here, Hess's complaint fails to include any facts that could 
demonstrate, either expressly, by the circumstances, or by the 
nature of the gifts that his intent was to condition the gifts on 
the marriage taking place. Cf. Mace v. Tingey, 106 Utah 420, 149 
P.2d 832, 834 (1944) (evaluating "the intention of the donor, the 
situation and relationship of the parties, the kind and character 
of the property, and the things said, written or done" in 
determining whether an irrevocable gift was given (emphasis 
omitted)). First, Hess does not allege that he expressly 
conditioned the gifts when he gave them. Second, the alleged 
circumstances existing at the time the gifts were made do not 
imply that the gifts were conditional. See, e.g., Maiorana v. 
Roj_as, No. 94988KCV2003, 2004 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 669 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 
June 4, 2004) (concluding that ring was not conditional gift when 
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circumstances showed it was given on donee's birthday). But see, 
e.g., Fanning v. Iverson, 535 N.W.2d 770, 772 (S.D. 1995) 
(holding that circumstances surrounding gift of money implied a 
condition of marriage where check memo indicated money was for 
wedding expenses). When evaluating the circumstances surrounding 
the gift, some jurisdictions will examine the purpose of the gift 
and inquire whether that purpose can be achieved only by the 
marriage taking place. See, e.g., Wagener v. Papie, 609 N.E.2d 
951, 953-54 (111. Ct. App. 1993) (examining circumstances 
surrounding gift/sale of family home to future son-in-law and 
finding that purpose of gift--to use home as marital home--would 
be frustrated when the marriage did not ensue) ; Cooper, 8 00 
N.E.2d 372, at U125-27, 32 (finding gift of improvements to the 
donee's home were not conditional where donor "merely presumed" 
but did not articulate the intention that they would live in the 
improved home after they wed); Restatement of Restitution § 58 
cmt. c & illus. 5 (1937) (noting that the gift of a car to a 
putative future son-in-law for the purpose of a honeymoon road 
trip may be recoverable because the purpose may only be achieved 
if the marriage ensues). Here, the facts alleged cannot support 
the conclusion that the purposes of the gifts were frustrated 
when the wedding did not take place. The complaint states that 
the purpose of the Alaskan cruise was to travel for pleasure 
before the wedding. The same purpose applied to the Paris trip, 
which also had the added purpose of allowing Johnston an 
opportunity to introduce Hess to her friends. The vasectomy was 
for the purpose of mutuality in birth control.5 And, the gift of 
money to Johnston's son was for the purpose of allowing him to 
purchase a vehicle. All of these purposes were achieved despite 
the fact that the parties did not marry. Thus, Hess's complaint 
fails to state any facts that suggest the circumstances 
surrounding these gifts implied they were conditioned on the 
marriage. 
Hl8 Finally, the nature of the gifts does not give rise to an 
inference that they were inherently conditional. Some 
jurisdictions have recognized that gifts, like engagement rings, 
carry with them an implied condition of marriage due to the 
inherent symbolism of the gift. See, e.g., Fierro, 465 N.W.2d at 
671 ("The inherent symbolism of [an engagement ring] forecloses 
the need to establish an express condition that marriage will 
ensue."); Heiman v. Parrish, 942 P.2d 631, 634 (Kan. 1997) 
("[E]ngagement rings should be considered, by their very nature, 
conditional gifts given in contemplation of marriage."); see also 
Restatement of Restitution § 58 cmt. c (noting that a donor may 
5Johnston had already undergone a tubal ligation, but 
remained concerned about the possibility of pregnancy. 
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be entitled to restitution "if the gift is an engagement ring, a 
family heirloom or some other thing intimately connected with the 
marriage"). Here, the nature of the gifts — trips, a vasectomy, 
and cash given to a third party--carry no inherent inference that 
they were conditioned on the marriage. 
fl9 Thus, even if Utah recognized recovery under a theory of 
conditional gift, which we do not decide today, Hess's claim for 
recovery would be barred because none of the alleged facts 
support the conclusion that at the time he made the gifts, he did 
not intend for them to take effect until the marriage ensued. 
Instead, the facts alleged in the complaint can only be read to 
support the conclusion that Hess intended an unconditional gift. 
We do recognize that the alleged facts suggest that the reason 
Hess gave the unconditional gifts was because he and Johnston 
were engaged. However, the reason for a gift should not be 
confused with a donor's intent that the gift be revokable. 
11
 'Many gifts are made for reasons that sour with the passage of 
time.' Unfortunately, gift law does not allow a donor to 
recover/revoke an inter vivos gift simply because his or her 
reasons for giving it have 'soured.'" Cooper v. Smith, 155 Ohio 
App. 3d 218, 2003-Ohio-6083, 800 N.E.2d 372, at ^25 (quoting 
Albanese v. Indelicate 51 A.2d 110 (N.J. 1947)); see also 
Restatement of Restitution § 58 (1937) ("A person who has 
conferred a benefit upon another, manifesting that he does not 
expect compensation therefor, is not entitled to restitution 
merely because his expectation that an existing relation will 
continue or that a future relation will come into existence is 
not realized, unless the conferring of the benefit is conditioned 
thereon."). We therefore affirm the trial court's dismissal of 
Hess's cause of action for recovery under a theory of conditional 
gift. 
B. Unjust Enrichment 
|^20 Hess's complaint does not allege facts sufficient to sustain 
a claim for restitution under a theory of unjust enrichment. To 
state a claim for unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must allege 
facts supporting three elements: "(1) a benefit conferred on one 
person by another; (2) an appreciation or knowledge by the 
conferee of the benefit; and (3) the acceptance or retention of 
the benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable 
for the conferee to retain the benefit without payment of its 
value." Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1248 (Utah 1998) 
(quotations omitted). Although Hess has pleaded facts that 
support the first two of these elements, his complaint fails to 
allege facts that can support the conclusion that it would be 
inequitable for Johnston to retain the benefits of the gifts 
without payment. 
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[^21 Unjust enrichment occurs when a person has and retains money 
or benefits that in justice and equity belong to another; 
however, l![t]he fact that a person benefits another is not itself 
sufficient to require the other to make restitution." Fowler v. 
Taylor/ 554 P.2d 205, 209 (Utah 1976). Money or benefits that 
have been "officiously or gratuitously furnished are not 
recoverable." Jeffs, 970 P.2d at 1248 (quotation omitted). A 
person acts gratuitously when, at the time he conferred the 
benefit, "there was no expectation of a return benefit, 
compensation, or consideration." Id. at 1246. As previously 
discussed, Hess's complaint fails to allege that, at the time the 
vacations, vasectomy, and money for the vehicle were given, he 
intended anything other than an unconditional gift. 
" [E] ririchment of the donee is the intended purpose of a gift, 
[therefore,] there is nothing 'unjust1 about allowing [the donee] 
to retain the gifts she received . . . in the absence of fraud, 
overreaching or some other circumstance."6 Cooper, 800 N.E.2d 
372, at 1|l5. Thus, the benefits were gratuitously bestowed on 
Johnston, and the trial court properly dismissed Hess's unjust 
enrichment claim. 
C. Promissory Estoppel7 
|^22 Like unjust enrichment, promissory estoppel is an equitable 
remedy and should be employed where injustice can be avoided only 
by enforcement of the promise. To state a claim for promissory 
estoppel, Hess must allege four elements: 
(1) [t]he plaintiff acted with prudence and 
in reasonable reliance on a promise made by 
the defendant; (2) the defendant knew that 
the plaintiff had relied on the promise which 
the defendant should reasonably expect to 
induce action or forbearance on the part of 
the plaintiff or a third person; (3) the 
defendant was aware of all material facts; 
and (4) the plaintiff relied on the promise 
and the reliance resulted in a loss to the 
plaintiff. 
6Hess has not alleged that Johnston fraudulently promised to 
marry him. 
7Hess also characterizes his claim for promissory estoppel 
as a claim of reasonable reliance. We, therefore, treat them 
together under the rubric of promissory estoppel. 
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Youncrblood v. Auto-Owners Ins, Co. , 2007 UT 28,1(16 (quotations 
omitted). Here, Hess has failed to allege facts that would 
support the first element, that he acted with prudence and 
reasonable reliance on Johnston's promise to marry. 
1(23 A promise to marry is unique in that it is not generally 
considered enforceable, but instead is made for the purpose of 
"allow [ing] a couple time to test the permanency of their 
feelings." Fierro v. Hoel, 465 N.W.2d 669, 672 (Iowa Ct. App. 
1990). Thus, the fact that the engagement period is, in essence, 
a test period makes reliance on the promise of marriage 
inherently problematic because "[w]hen either party lacks . . . 
assurance, for whatever reason, the engagement should be broken." 
Id.; see also Jackson v. Brown, 904 P.2d 685, 687 (Utah 1995) 
("It is certainly the policy of the state to uphold marriage 
vows. However, we see no benefit in discouraging or penalizing 
persons who realize, before making these vows, that for whatever 
reason, they are unprepared to take such an important step.").8 
This is especially true when, as here, the couple had not even 
set an actual date for their nuptials.9 Cf. Gilbert v. Barkes, 
987 S.W.2d 772, 777 (Ky. 1999) (holding that recovery was 
unavailable because where no wedding date is set, the plaintiff 
could not "affirmatively demonstrate the parties' final and 
serious intent to enter into marriage"). Without foreclosing the 
possibility that, in some instances, the acts undertaken in 
8After all, 
[w]hat fact justifies the breaking of an 
engagement? The absence of a sense of humor? 
Differing musical tastes? Differing 
political views? The painfully learned fact 
that marriages are made on earth, not in 
heaven. They must be approached with 
intelligent care and should not happen 
without a decent assurance of success. When 
either party lacks that assurance, for 
whatever reason, the engagement should be 
broken. No justification is needed. Either 
party may act. Fault, impossible to fix, 
does not count. 
Fierro v. Hoel, 465 N.W.2d 669, 672 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990). 
9Hess does allege that in late 2004 the couple eventually 
set an actual wedding date for May 5, 2005. However, at the time 
the trips were taken, the vasectomy was performed, and the money 
was given to Johnston's son, the couple had not yet set an actual 
date for a wedding but were, instead, tentatively planning to 
marry sometime in November 2004. 
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reliance on a promise of marriage can be so intertwined with the 
promise itself that reliance may be reasonable, 10 in this 
instance, Hess's complaint fails to allege facts that can support 
the conclusion that he was acting prudently and reasonably on 
Johnston's promise of marriage. All that can be inferred from 
the facts alleged in the complaint is that Hess made several 
irrevocable gifts during the engagement period. Thus, this is 
not a situation where "injustice can be avoided" only by awarding 
restitution damages, Skanchy v. Calcados Ortope SA, 952 P.2d 
1071, 1077 (Utah 1998), and Hess's promissory estoppel claim 
fails as a matter of law. 
D. Breach of Contract 
1)24 Similarly, even assuming without deciding that Jackson v. 
Brown, 904 P.2d 685 (Utah 1995), does not preclude a claim for 
breach of contract based on reciprocal promises to marry, Hess's 
claim fails because his allegations cannot support a conclusion 
that the damages were causally related to the breach. 
i|2 5 Hess does not allege that Johnston made any promise to repay 
him if the marriage did not ensue; she never promised to pay for 
half of the travel, or to bear the cost of the vehicle herself. 
The only promise Johnston made was to marry Hess. Thus, in order 
to recover general damages, Hess would be required to show that 
the damages or injuries he sustained "flow[ed] naturally from the 
breach" of that promise. Machan v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 
2005 UT 37,1|15, 116 P. 3d 342 (quotations omitted). Or, to 
recover consequential damages, Hess must demonstrate that the 
damages he sustained were "reasonably within the contemplation 
of, or reasonably foreseeable, by the parties at the time the 
contract was made." Id. (quotations omitted). Under the 
circumstances of this case, none of the allegations show how 
restitution for gifts of travel, a vasectomy, and money to a 
third party flow naturally from a breach of a promise to marry or 
were reasonably contemplated by the parties at the time they 
decided to wed. As previously discussed, none of these gifts or 
the circumstances under which they were given suggest that they 
were in any way conditioned on the promise to marry being 
fulfilled. Additionally, neither the travel, the vasectomy, nor 
the gift of money to Johnston's son were preparatory acts 
10As noted in Jackson v. Brown, 904 P.2d 685 (Utah 1995), it 
may be reasonable, under certain circumstances, to rely on 
another's promise of marriage when undertaking "normal expenses 
attendant to a wedding." Id. at 687. However, we do not reach 
that question because Hess is not seeking recovery of expenses 
directly related to a wedding. 
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required to be performed under the contract to marry. To hold 
otherwise would give rise to a claim for breach of contract--
albeit for economic damages instead of emotional damages--"any 
time a person, for whatever reason, cancels or indefinitely 
postpones wedding plans." Jackson, 904 P.2d at 687. This result 
is clearly "contrary to the public policy of this state" because 
"such an action [would] be readily amenable to abuse [and] would 
discourage individuals with legitimate doubts or concerns about a 
planned wedding from cancelling the event." Id. Therefore, 
Hess's claims for restitution under a breach of contract theory 
were properly dismissed as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
%2G Rule 11 sanctions are inappropriate where, as here, 
counsel's interpretation of existing law is reasonable and there 
is no other evidence demonstrating counsel's failure to make a 
reasonable inquiry required by rule 11. Therefore, the trial 
court's denial of Johnston's motion for sanctions was proper. It 
was also proper for the trial court to dismiss Hess's complaint 
because the facts alleged could not support recovery of 
restitution under any of the grounds pleaded. 
%21 Affirmed. 
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge 
K2 8 WE CONCUR: 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
20060497-CA 13 
